




























































A First Glimpse into the Ultimate Absolute. 
The Emergence of Genetic Analyses in 
Husserl’s Beranuer Manuscripts on Time-
Consciousness and the Exploration of the 
Realm of Passivity.
Giovanni Jan Giubilato
Starting by pointing out the deep interconnec-
tions between temporality and passivity within 
phe nomenology, the present paper intends to 
contribute with a reconstruction of Husserl’s 
“first glimpses” into the sphere of passivity and its 
genesis based on the Beranuer Manuscripts on 
Time-Consciousness (1917-18). To do so, it will 
follow a disposition in four stages: after a brief 
intro duction, section I will display the emergence 
of the genetic methodology and its functional 
position within the broader context of the archi-
tectonic system of phenomenology. After that, 
section II will follow the development of the 
notion of “absolute consciousness” by clarifying 
the constitutive problematic of time-conscious-
ness and the related problem of an infinite regress 
(that threatened Husserl’s thought for many 
years). Section III will expose the first genetic 
model of time-con sciousness as developed in the Bernauer paying particular 
attention to the discover of a transcen dental realm of passivity and pre-
egoic constitution. Finally, section IV will provide a translation of Eugen 
Fink’s disposition draft for the edition of Husserl’s Bernauer Manuscripts, as 
he and Husserl planned it around 1930. Those documents can provide a deep 
understanding of Husserl’s texts, of the problems related to consciousness 
self-constitution and its relation with the questions concern ing a phenome-
nology of passivity and passive synthesis.
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Ronald Bruzina in memoriam,
whose work continues to inspire 
 and make dialogues possible.
Introduction
In the famous paragraph §81 concerning phenomenological time and consciousness 
of time of his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology (1913), wherewith the so 
called transcendental turn of phenomenology was established, Husserl claimed that 
the transcendental “absolute” that had been «brought about by the reductions, is, in 
truth, not what is ultimate; it is something that constitutes itself in a certain pro-
found and completely peculiar sense of its own, and that has its primal source in what 
is ultimately and truly absolute» (Husserl 1983, 193). Hence, the region of pure con-
sciousness and its universal structures, this phenomenological residuum which the 
Ideas profoundly investigated and, first of all, opened up as transcendental field of re-
search, had to be considered not only as constituting 1 
but also as constituted «in a certain profound and com-
pletely peculiar sense of its own». This means that the 
process of consciousness self-constitution cannot be 
thought as equal to the constitutive process of objects 
and realities in general within absolute consciousness 
itself. Moreover, this fundamental problem involves (in 
a still unclear manner) some “other” absolute, as “its 
primal source”.
Aware both of the incomplete character of his 
first book of the Ideas, and of the methodological ne-
cessity of leaving «out of account the enigma of consciousness of time in [...] pre-
liminary analyses without endangering their rigor» (1983, 194), in the following 
years Husserl undertook several attempts to sink, by means of transcendental re-
flection, into this “ultimately and truly phenomenological absolute”, as his research 
manuscripts and his academic activity clearly demon-
strate. 2 Considered as one of the most interesting at-
tempts to deal with the problem of time, the Beranuer 
Manuscripts on Time-Consciousness 3 represent the 
second great atlas of a phenomenology of time, yield 
by Husserl after the famous Lectures on the phenome-
nology of the consciousness of internal time of 1905 
(Husserl 1991) and more than ten years before the fa-
mous C-Manuscripts on time and time-constitution 
(2006), written during the 1930s and where he exam-
ined the question concerning the ultimate mode-of-be-
ing of the transcendental subjectivity – which is the 
same, as Held (1966, vii) already specified, to question 
the vitality [Lebendigkeit] of life in its experiencing con-
nection with the world. In particular, the Bernauer are 
resulting from the philosophical effort of someone who 
“for decades did not speculate about a new Atlantis but 
instead actually journeyed in the trackless wilderness of 
a new continent and undertook the virgin cultivation of 
some of its areas”, and thereby did not excuses himself 
1 As Husserl (1983) states: «in 
its essence it is independent of 
all worldly, all natural Being; nor 
does it need any worldly Being 
for its existence. The existence 
of a Nature cannot be the condi-
tion for the existence of conscious-
ness, since Nature itself turns out 
to be a correlate of conscious-
ness: Nature is only as being-con-
stituted in regular concatena-
tions of consciousness» (116).
2 Cf. in this sense his Vorwort 
zum Jahrbuch für Philosophie und 
phänomenologische Forschung, 
Nr. 2, 1916 (Husserl 1987, 65-66); 
the Freiburger Antrittsrede of 
1917 on Phenomenology, its 
research field and its method 
(Husserl 1987, 68-81), and the 
planned but never published 
essays on Phänomenologie und 
Psychologie and Phänomenologie 
und Erkenntnistheorie, both from 
1917 (Husserl 1987, 82-205). See 
also the lectures on Natur und 
Geist from 1919 (Husserl 2001b).
3 All the following quotations from 
this work and from all the writ-
ings listed in the references which 
are not in English have been trans-
lated, when necessary, by the 
author. To facilitate the intra-lin-
guistic comprehensibility of the 
texts and avoid confusion between 
terms, I opted to keep the ger-
man word “Erlebnis” (experi-
ence, experiencing as mental pro-









































































«from the pain of undertaking travels in the new land» (Husserl 1989, 422) and ex-
ploring this sort of unknown continent. Written mainly during two different sojourns 
in the small village of Bernau in the Black Forest during 1917 and 1918, they have been 
considered for many years by Husserl himself his magnum opus. As Husserl wrote to 
Heidegger in 1918: «A great work is growing up for me here in the quiet high valley – 
time and individuation, a renewal of a rational metaphysics from its principles. Here 
in Bernau I was immediately, from the first day on, the ‘other’, my counter-ego, the 
better I, the ‘feathered soul’, to speak with the Phaidros» (1994, 130). On April the 
fifth of the same year, as Roman Ingarden later recalled (Husserl 1968, 152-155), dur-
ing a visit in Freiburg Husserl told him that he was very busy, even ten hours a day in 
the silent solitude of the valley, «dealing with the immense attempt of a final clarifi-
cation of the deepest problems of phenomenological constitution, and of their rela-
tionship with the consciousness of time» (153).
In fact the Bernauer represent one of the most comprehensive accounts 
coming from the period immediately after the publication of the Ideas of the phe-
nomenological problems related to the self-constitution of the absolute consciousness 
and its original temporal flow. In this work Husserl explores in detail and for the first 
time (Cf. Niel 2010; 2013) the realm of primal-phenomenality: the passive genesis, the 
pre-categorical and ante-predicative foundation of consciousness’ life, that is: the hid-
den and anonymous counterpart of consciousness’ activity, what he calls «the name-
less above all comprehensible, that which is above all, not standing, not floating, not 
existing, but functioning» (Husserl, 2001, 278). By virtue of this plunge into the con-
stitutive depths of transcendental subjectivity and its historicity, this texts are one of 
the most important, but also less studied documents proposing a new genetic appro-
ach to the “enigma of time”: that of transcendental temporality, the synthetic (self-)
constitution of transcendental consciousness (or primal flow), and its hyletic levels 
of passivity and affectivity. The emergence of a phenomenological genetic method, 
which has proven its great importance both for the development of Husserl’s thought 
during the 1920s and for its final configuration in the 1930s, is clearly documented 
by two main aspects: 1) a somehow “new”, surely for Husserl at that time “innova-
tive” theory of the «temporality in genetic consideration» (2001, 273-288); and 2) a 
new constitutive model of time-consciousness that could satisfactorily and properly 
explain also the peculiar sense of the self-constitution process. In this regard, Husserl 
was dealing since his Lectures (1991) with the threat of an infinite regress, caused by 
the fact that consciousness constitutive acts are constantly requiring new and deep-
er levels of activity in order to explain their constitution, which should be based upon 
this subjacent levels of the stream of consciousness. To escape this paradox in the 
Bernauer Manuscripts Husserl even developed the notion of some kind of primal flow 
of consciousness that should be nor constituted nor constituting any sort of objec-
tiveness or of upper consciousness levels. To avoid the regressus ad infinitum regard-
ing consciousness constitution, he tried to conceive the presence, at the bottom of the 
temporal consciousness, of a mere flow of original hyletic data – which had to be, in 
itself, unconscious. Phenomenologically it may be conceived as
a mere potentiality of possible perception, for which it would be enough an original process, 
such as an original process of sensory data flowing-off, fading-away, etc. which in itself, how-
ever, is not a time-constituting process, but that becomes one, and can at any time become 
one, only through a subsequent and collateral “apprehension” […] This process, just hypothet-
ically considered, should not be constitutive for an immanent Erlebnis of first level. On the 









































































Thus the essential character of this flow of hyletic data at the bottom of conscious-
ness life would be precisely their lack of constitution, their “not-yet being constituted” 
as individual temporal objectivities. As Husserl writes: their «esse does not coincide 
with their percipi» (2001, 191), they are without being perceived. But then, Husserl 
wonders, in this case to is it still possible to speak of phenomenological data within 
the sphere of the original hyletic flow, if they’re not perceived, end thus do not ap-
pear at all? Can a «process of primal life be without really being a process of con-
sciousness? And can a process of consciousness be without being conscious of itself 
as a process?» (188). And finally, does the hypothetical assumption of a nor consti-
tuting nor constituted primary flow really shields the investigation from am infinite 
regression into more and more levels of non-constituted flows and intentional dark-
ness? «Are we really well protected from the dangers of a infinite regress by the as-
sumption of ‘unconscious’, unintentional, ‘non-constituted’ processes, and is this as-
sumption conceivable at all?» (200). Since every apprehension [Auffassung] of some 
content [Inhalt] requires a lower constitutive level, from which the apprehensive act 
arises, even admitting that some king of grasping could have the ability to establish a 
connection with some kind of not-intentional flow of hyletic data, the resulting con-
sciousness of constituted objectivities and of their temporal succession cannot derive 
from the mere succession of consciousness phases. In this case a time-consciousness 
would then be impossible, because – as Husserl established since his Lectures of 1905 
– a mere (conscious) succession of consciousness phases does not ensure the con-
sciousness of the succession itself, i.e. consciousness of time. Consequently Husserl 
had to face the challenge of transforming and deepening his reductive inquiry into a 
previously unexplored «pre-egoic sphere», i.e. the sphere where the original sensual-
ity [ursprüngliche Sensualität] lies, and where protention and retention – those fun-
damental mechanisms of consciousness’ life – are to be considered as «completely 
egoless sensual tendencies» [völlig ichlose sinnliche Tendenzen] (2001, 276).
On the basis of these premises, this shift towards original sensuality and 
the pre-egoic sphere corresponds precisely to the development of Husserl’s thought 
in the following years, and more precisely to what he set in motion at the beginning 
of the 1920s with his Analysen zur passiven Synthesis (1966). These lectures, firstly 
given in 1920/21 and then repeatedly readjusted in 1923 and 1925/26, offer an exam-
ination of a highly diverse and rich field of research: that of «transcendental logic» – 
as Husserl firstly entitled them – or of «primal constitution» (1966, xiv). The discov-
er of passive syntheses provided Husserl with the (possible) conception of a passive 
genesis that embraces a wide range of phenomena of association, such as affection, 
irritation effects on the ego, and all those passive experience-processes, according to 
which consciousness flow has to be considered, in itself (i.e. an sich), as a multi-lay-
er structure of constitutive performances, actively and passively fulfilled. All those 
associative forms of passivity and genetic constitution are detailed in Husserl’s text 
of the mentioned lectures. But the specific attention to a phenomenology of passiv-
ity corresponds also – and therefore is in complete harmony with – to the later re-
sults of the wide-ranging, systematic and architectural reflection on phenomenolo-
gy as a whole philosophical system 4 and on its different 
levels of implementation, which was the focus of the 
collaboration and joint-enterprise between Husserl and 
Fink in the 1930s. 5 The planned book on the System 
of Phenomenological Philosophy, on which Fink and 
Husserl worked together at the beginning of the 1930s, 
was thought to produce an overall systematization of 
4 On the phenomenological archi-
tectonic and the phenomenolog-
ical sense of a system cf. Fink 
(1966, 2-3; 1988a; 1988b, 3-105).
5 In this regard my interpretation 
is not in accordance with Zahavi’s 









































































the most diverse phenomenological analyses and their 
mutual relations, clearly according to a multi-levels 
structure that corresponded to a multi-levels theory 
of Being (Fink 1989, 8). Accordingly, the section where 
“primal intentionality” was discussed had to provide a 
theory on the
Phenomenology of ‘Instincts’ […] The primal intentionality still 
undifferentiated: successful constitution of Being as good; for-
mation of the spaces of play [Spielräume] for the bodily per-
ceptive movements [Kinästhesen]; the intentional finality of the 
primal drives [Urtriebe], the problem of the “unconscious’ […] 
Phenomenology of primal association: the pre-ontic formation 
of units within hyletic fields, phenomena of merging and differentiation within the primal 
passive sphere (Fink, 1988b, 8).
Hence, by pointing out the relation between temporality and passivity, the present 
paper intends to contribute with a reconstruction of Husserl’s “first glimpses” into 
the sphere of the so called “ultimate absolute” and into its genesis at the most deeper 
level: the one of passivity, of sensuality and stimuli. 
I. Static and Genetic Phenomenology
For Husserl the only absolute Being is the “subjectivity” of consciousness, in which ta-
kes place the primal constitution (time-constitution or Zeitigung) of consciousness 
itself and of the universe of transcendent objects (i.e. nature in general). For obvious 
reasons of space, let us leave aside the question if this Cartesian starting point of 
Husserl’s thinking – the apodicity of the cogito – had to necessarily block him the 
access to the ultimate character of transcendental consciousness – as Fink pointed 
out (2008, 37, 182-183) – or even produced an incapacity to establish the sense of 
the sum belonging to this cogito, i.e. the mode-of-being of that subjectivity, the con-
stituting pole of what is constituted – as Heidegger’s critique had shown in the ear-
ly 1920s (Heidegger, 1994). From an immanent point of view, Husserl had basically 
two different possibilities to phenomenologically conceive consciousness primal flow: 
one that thinks it as a necessary process of constitution, that is, a process that ge-
nerates the constitution of temporal objects in the immanent time according to the 
idetic law of esse est percipi; and a second one – as mentioned above – that propo-
ses to consider constitution and intentional objectiveness as the exclusive domain of 
reflection, i.e. of a reflection that succeeds in annexing itself to a primal flow of hyle-
tic data that would be (somehow) sufficient for the constitution of primordial hyletic 
units, but in need of some grasping (or apprehensions) for a real and proper constitu-
tion of objectivities. More importantly, according to Husserl both possibilities refer to 
the question of whether «the life of the ego is a constant process of constitution of 
(primary) phenomenological time and of immanent objects in it, or not» (2001, 204), 
whereas must be conceded that the ego somehow always makes experience «of this 
temporality all the time, [and] therefore one can also speak of a temporal stream of 
Erlebnisse that, however, are not at all what is ultimate» (204). So, if the deepest 
(“ultimate” or “original”) level of the stream of consciousness is not the stream of the 
Erlebnisse, with its noetic and noematic structures and continua, what is consciou-
sness in radical sense? Husserl sought answers to these questions already in a text 
to perceive the true extent of the 
transformation that Husserl’s 
thinking underwent in the last 
period of his life» (1994, 3), and 
more in line with the proposal of 
Bruzina (2004), whose approach to 
both Husserl’s philosophy in the 
1930s and Fink’s early philosophy as 
«dialectical interplay between two 
philosophical thinkers» (3) is not 
only strongly proven by Husserl’s 
philosophical writings and corre-
spondence, but also by Fink’s own 
material, which is currently being 
published in his Gesamtausgabe 









































































from 1908 (now published as text Nr. 4 of Husserliana XXXVI, where he writes that 
consciousness must be
the root and – with another image – the source of everything that ‘Being’ means and can mean. 
It is the root: it carries every other individual Being, be it immanent, be it transcendent. If Being 
is individual Being, that lasts and in its duration changing and not changing, is temporal being, 
then consciousness is no being. It is the carrier of time, but not temporal itself and not being 
temporal, which does not prevent it from finding a filling into time through ‘subjectivation” 
(a certain kind of objectification) and then ‘shaped’ into something that lasts, into a temporal 
object. But in itself it is not temporal (2003, 70).
Quite interesting is the fact that here Husserl is already trying to think the transcen-
dental (or pure) consciousness, the core or root of all constitution, as something that 
is “no being”, and that is defined as “non-Being” and “not being temporal” because it 
is the carrier of time. Ten years later, in the Bernauer Manuscripts, we find Husserl 
trying to clarify the same question about the mentioned type, or modalities, of con-
sciousness “subjectivation”. This is one of the first observations of consciousness pri-
mal flow that can be described as genetic. Husserl’s description proceeds here as it 
where a descent into the transcendental and innermost history of the ego, a regres-
sion deep down into the primal phenomenal sphere of subjectivity and its appearing: 
the primal-ego and its (self-)temporalizing life. 
The identical, not an objective being, and not-temporal I as functioning pole (primal state) 
[Urstand] of the flow of Erlebnisse, the I as identical pole for every Erlebnis and for everything 
that is included in the intentionality of the Erlebnisse (e.g. nature as intended nature) is the 
pole for all the time series and, as such, necessarily ‘supra’-temporal; the I, for which time 
constitutes itself, for which there is temporality and individual and singular objectivity in the 
intentionality of the Erlebnis-sphere, but which is in itself not temporal. Hence in this sense 
it’s also not a ‘being’ but counterpart of all being, not an object [Gegenstand] but primal state 
[Urstand] for all objectivity. […] It’s the nameless above all comprehensible, that which is above 
all, not standing, not floating, not existing, but functioning (2001, 277-8.)
The two different points of view on what consciousness ultimately is, exemplified by 
these two quotations, correspond to the distinction developed by Husserl between 
static and genetic phenomenology within the transcendental field of experience al-
ready discovered in the Ideas. In fact, in 1921 Husserl explicitly dedicated some pages 
to the analysis of static and genetic phenomenological methodology. They are found 
in the fundamental manuscript B III 10 with the title Static and genetic Method, par-
tially published in the mentioned volume of the Analysen zur passiven Synthesis 
(1966, 336-345). This text is important not only because of the lucidity of the exposi-
tion and the attempt to systematize the phenomenological methodology by clarifying 
its different directions and its operational terminology, but above all – as it frequent-
ly happens in phenomenological practice – because of all the hesitations, deviations, 
evolutions and reshaping that it contains. Generally speaking, Husserl distinguishes 
here at least three different and main levels of phenomenology: «1) universal phe-
nomenology of the general consciousness structures; 2) constitutive phenomenolo-
gy; 3) phenomenology of the genesis» (1966, 340). If Husserl at first sight contrasts 
static or descriptive phenomenology with genetic phenomenology, and distinguishes 
from both of them the so-called constitutive phenomenology (that initially seemed 









































































however he considers constitutive phenomenology as more than just a bridge be-
tween the two spheres of methodological influence, and more than a simple link be-
tween the different phenomenological regions. In fact there is «another ‘constitutive’ 
phenomenology, the one of genesis, which tracks back the history, the necessary his-
tory of objectification and thus the history of the object itself as an object of a pos-
sible realization» (345). Static phenomenology is the universal phenomenology of 
the general structures of consciousness, i.e. a phenomenology of the eidetic forms 
of pure consciousness – regardless of their formation process or origin – investigat-
ed according to their teleological direction and noetic-noematic order within imma-
nence. This research program, which traces the general structures of consciousness 
starting with the description of their mode of givenness within intuition, represents 
just a first-level phenomenology: it schematizes the intentional structures according 
to the three moments of ego – cogito – cogitatum. It is also called by Husserl ana-
lytical phenomenology, as it’s an universal theory of consciousness, universal theory 
of perceptions and so of every possible objectivity according to its categorical varia-
tions. That is to say, static phenomenology describes the correlation between objec-
tivity that appears as it appears for a consciousness and the subject (the conscious-
ness activity) for which it appears. Through it, phenomenology has already set for 
itself the task of explaining those apriori structural forms which are essential for ex-
perience, and of analyzing the transcendental subjectivity that functions within them. 
Producing a “fixed typology”, i.e. a general study of essential types and structures 
(eida) of the experienced world and of the experiential correlation between the sub-
ject and the world (cf. Husserl 1991b, 87), phenomenology has already prefigured the 
following stage of investigation. In fact, the static description of an intentional expe-
rience through the analysis of the correlation complex of noesis and noema, which 
constitutes the fundamental differentiation within consciousness intentionality, pro-
vides a transcendental guide to the study of this a priori correlation, which conse-
quently leads into other, completely new paths of transcendental research. Since the 
thematic area of the transcendental phenomenology is the transcendental conscious-
ness and its constitutive activity, the theory of transcendental constitution is one of 
the first main pieces of the intentional-constitutive enlightenment of the world-ex-
periencing subjectivity and its correlative structures. The most fundamental activi-
ty of the transcendental ego is therefore the origination of meaning [Sinnstiftung], 
also called formation of meaning [Sinnbildung]. This creative, constitutive activity is, 
as Van Breda already in 1946 during the IV Congrès des Sociétés de Philosophie de 
Langue Française pointed out, “absolutely free”, since it is «the direct and immediate 
expression of radical autonomy and thus of the inalienable freedom of the spirit as 
such» (Van Breda 1973, 280). 
But at this point phenomenology has to deal with the following question: 
how has been generated this whole system of transcendental freedom? How it has 
come into Being, how it’s been constituted? It is precisely the question of the gene-
sis: the constitutive becoming, the realization of intentional experiences within con-
sciousness immanence according to fixed laws and operations, among which Husserl 
considers synthesis and temporalization to be fundamental. The genetic constitu-
tion analysis shows that every intentional act, and every intentional object of this act, 
are the result of some intentional performances: «all intentional units are from an 
intentional genesis, are constituted units, and everywhere one can examine the fin-
ished units according to their constitution, according to their entire genesis» (Husserl 
1974, 216). The main problem for genetic analyses on constitution and on the inten-









































































ego actively plays in all this (cf. Almeida 1972). At this point, before approaching the 
problematic of genesis and entering the realm of passivity which is involved in it, we 
need to briefly clarify the relation between the pure, or absolute consciousness and 
the constitution (and self-constitution) processes. 
II. Absolute Consciousness and Constitution.
Providing a general account on the possible forms of objectivation within conscious-
ness immanence, Husserl introduced the notion of absolute consciousness during 
winter semester 1906/07 in his Lectures on ethics and the theory of knowledge 
(1984), however without explicitly connecting the concept of absolute conscious-
ness to the analysis of time-consciousness. This fundamental step took place around 
1909, and is documented in the text Nr. 39 of the Husserliana X, where he writes: 
What is given as unity, and, as we presuppose here, is adequately given as individual and thus 
temporal Being, is not really immanently given in the last absolute sense, namely not given 
as part of the absolute consciousness. […] Whatever is perceived, whatever is self-given as an 
individual object, is given as a unit of an absolute non-given multiplicity. […] To a certain ex-
tent, absolute consciousness lies before all unification, i.e. all objectivation. Unity is the unity 
of objectivation, and objectivation is objectifying, but not objectified. All non-objectified ob-
jectivation belongs to the sphere of absolute consciousness (1969, 283). 
Another text from the lectures of 1909, published in the Husserliana XXIII as text Nr. 
8 (1980, 265-269), shows clearly not only attempt to reconsider the notion of ab-
solute consciousness, but also to overcome the model that guided Husserl’s consti-
tution analyses since the Logical Investigations, which was based on the operating 
of an apprehension-act over an apprehension-content. The sphere of absolute con-
sciousness, inasmuch as it is pure experience of an object that is actually immanent 
in intentional consciousness, must be itself constituent of it. The character proper to 
the constitution that takes place in absolute consciousness is identified by Husserl in 
the notion of double intentionality (1969, 269). According to this theory, initially re-
ferred by Husserl especially to the operating of retention, to every intention belongs 
a double intentional-reference: the immanent temporal object (as unity of meaning) 
has to be constituted together with the unity of the consciousness flow which is con-
scious of that (now constituted) objectuality. On the basis of this theory of double in-
tentionality Husserl can therefore affirm that the absolute flow of consciousness pro-
vides the original self-constitution, since the self-consciousness of the flow does not 
require an additional level of consciousness, but instead constitutes itself within and 
together every phase of consciousness and every object of consciousness. Moreover, 
each phase that makes up the absolute flow of consciousness possesses intentional 
reference to the phases of an immanent object, or of a plurality of objects, which are 
synthetically unified in a single Erlebnis. The double intentional reference presuppos-
es a double intentional directedness for every ecstatic intention that forms the origi-
nal horizon of consciousness life: i.e. for retention, protention and primal presentation. 
Husserl, however, in his Lectures of 1905 focuses almost exclusively on the precise 
determination of the retentional function, since it’s fundamental for the constitu-
tion of the past and of the horizon of past events. To conclude, it can be noted that 
since the 1909 lectures, as a consequence of the researches conducted on the imma-
nence of temporal objects, absolute consciousness is conceived as pure intentional 









































































that cannot be totally reduced to the immanence of that appearance. And it is only 
when the absolute consciousness goes from being a sort of pure and totally transpar-
ent Erlebniss (as in the first texts form 1906/07) to being an intentional constituent 
consciousness that absolute consciousness has to be also self-constituent conscious-
ness, in order to avoid the well known problems related to the infinite regress and the 
model apprehension/apprehension content. But now the challenge lies in the expla-
nation of this kind of absolute self-constitution and its genetic development.
III. Genetic Self-constitution: the Discover of Passivity and Pre-egoic 
Sphere.
As we’ve seen, according to Husserl’s belief it is not possible to find a solution for 
the problem of infinite regress by postulating a non-constituted primary flow, com-
posed only of hyletic data. Then, it remains only one possibility to escape this sort of 
“bad infinity” (Hegel) that endangers the phenomenological theory of constitution and 
self-constitution of absolute consciousness. If it is not phenomenologically correct 
to assume any kind of unconscious consciousness, then the primal flow of absolute 
consciousness 
constituting the immanent object of the first level should not only be a self-constituting pro-
cess, i.e. a process that is itself ‘perceived’, ‘internally conscious’, but also in such a way that it 
would have to be in itself, without demanding new processes, conscious of itself, a process 
constituted for itself: thus a last primal process, whose Being would be consciousness and 
consciousness of itself and its temporality. How is this possible? (Husserl 2001, 191).
The only way to find a possible solution for the fundamental aporia of temporal an-
alytics, to establishing the basic structure of time-consciousness and so to solve the 
problem of infinite regress, is therefore to think about self-constitution essentially as 
a movement of self-relatedness [Selbstbezogenheit] of the primal flow towards it-
self, and precisely a self-relatedness that is both constitutive and self-conscious. To 
achieve this goal Husserl’s analysis need to move on two fronts: first of all they have 
to follow the constitution of the immanent objects, also called events of first level; at 
the same time to explain also the constitution of the secondary level, i.e. of the pro-
cess itself. Therefore, to clarify how the double directness of intentional constitution 
can actually take place, in the Bernauer Husserl tries for the first time to develop a 
new approach, taking into account the role of protention. 
The protention is that ecstatic directness of consciousness that finds its 
fulfillment [Erfüllung] in the being-conscious of the imminent, upcoming primary 
presentation. Protentional intentionality, stretched out towards future horizon as 
original consciousness of what is coming up from there, finds its fulfillment when 
that what was “about to happen” has become present in the consciousness as some-
thing present. Therefore, in the case of retention, the fulfillment process involves a 
coincidence between “where-to” of intentional directedness and the “where-from” 
of original presentation – technically called by Husserl Gegenwärtigung. This pecu-
liar coincidence of anticipating the meaning of something individual with its (pos-
sible but not necessary) being-present implies a consciousness directedness which 
refers, in its “being stretched towards something”, to a previous “where-to” of the 
intention. In fact, when an original protention reaches its fulfillment, that is to say, it 
is filled in the course of the conscious process and the aimed object is constituted as 









































































of consciousness is, first of all, an empty, unfilled intentionality. This empty antici-
pation of what is to come, of what can come from the horizon of future, can turn 
into a consciousness-of-something as being present which has the character of the 
fulfillment.
The self-relatedness of the different phases of consciousness in the prima-
ry flow, i.e. the immanent primary phases and the phases of the flow itself – which 
is the keystone for the solution of the whole constitutive problematic – is connected, 
context of the Bernauer Manuscripts, with with the topic of intentional fulfillment. 
But as the self-constitution of the primary flow has been previously qualified as a 
process of double constitution, i.e. the constitution of primary and secondary ob-
jectualities (cf. Moran & Embree 2004, 29), then also the fulfillment within absolute 
consciousness must reveal a double intentional directedness. In the same way as the 
intentional constitutive directness of absolute consciousness, firstly identified in the 
Lectures on the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time, had been 
distinguished in the double direction of longitudinal and transverse intentionality 
[Langsintentionalität and Querintentionalität] (Husserl 1991a, 85-86) – where the 
first refers to the flow intending itself in its flowing and the second to the intending 
of immanent objects that are enduring in immanent time –, the fulfillment process 
and its phenomenological results had to be investigated also according to two oppo-
site but integrated constitutive functions: 1) the constitution of immanent time and 
of the objectualities that appear in it, and 2) the constitution of the original flow as 
such. Accordingly, Husserl distinguishes a general fulfillment, by which the self-con-
stitution of the primal flow can happen, and a particular fulfillment, that syntheti-
cally generates a first level of immanent temporal objects.
Given that, after a comprehensive analysis of the general and particular 
fulfillment and after a preliminary consideration of protention and retention from a 
genetic perspective, Husserl has finally set the stage for a genetic inquiry into time 
consciousness and constitution. This is reflected by Husserl’s emphasis on the dy-
namic and historical, almost teleological character of the fundamental structures of 
time consciousness, and its constitutive performance, constantly directed towards 
Being as primal constitutive result (Husserl 2004, 289-309). Later Fink called it 
Urnoematisierung, that is: the ontification process by which absolute, transcenden-
tal consciousness becomes worldly or human consciousness «in the deepest consti-
tutive apprehension of itself» (Fink 2006, 43). Of course it involves a peculiar genet-
ic temporalization of consciousness itself, whereby first of all it constitutes its own 
Being and perceives its own constitution as being. That is why it’s called ontification. 
The main point here is that this innermost constitutive functioning of conscious-
ness, and its teleological directness towards Being, presupposes retention and pro-
tention as indissoluble intentional interweaving. Therefore, Husserl is not only con-
sidering the interlace of intentional and protentional intentionality in relation with 
the other ecstatic directedness that originally concurs to forms the temporal field, i.e. 
original presentation (2004, 3-19), and the graduality of the fulfillment process that 
takes place within every consciousness phase (2004, 20-49) from a genetical point 
of view, but consequently he’s also making the effort to conceive retention as moti-
vation for protention, and the latter as an inverted retention. But then, Husserl asks, 
how is it possible to imagine the beginning of such a process of mutual and genet-
ically interdependent relations of protention, retention and primary presentation? 
How could be the beginning of the primary flow phenomenologically given? It’s nec-
essary to take a sort of step back, and execute a regressive inquiry into the history 










































































Genetically the task would be to make understandable how even before the completed for-
mation of a constitutive process, i.e. before the being-conscious of a temporal object, can and 
must be formed a consciousness, and a constitutive process. In other words, clarification of 
the idea of the awakening I, of an I, whose life begins, and how it necessarily had to become 
a life of consciousness (2004, 13-14).
To examine the genetic beginnings of consciousness life, as life of an awaken I, will 
bring Husserl in the following years to deal intensively with the problems concern-
ing the borders of phenomenality and with the questions regarding e.g. intentional-
ity in the mode of wakefulness and in the mode of being-asleep, a phenomenology 
of instincts and of affectivity (Husserl, 2014). A systematic preliminary delineation 
of all those fields of study and phenomenological research – which Husserl under-
stood as an infinitely ongoing philosophical joint work between generations serving 
as first maps of unknown lands to subsequently fix trough phenomenological proofs 
undreamt-of discoveries of the transcendental continent – had to ground itself on a 
previous explanation of how “a real beginning of the constitution of the ego and of 
the immanent hyletic, and in general of the inner temporal field must look like, which 
is presupposed for the universal constitution of the primordial and of the completely 
objective world of experience of this ego” (Husserl, 2002, 469). But the role that the 
Ego plays in all this as functioning pole, or primal state [Urstand], of every imagina-
ble and constitutable flow of Erlebnisse, that necessarily has in it its principle of uni-
ty and motivation, is not immediately apparent in Husserl’s analysis of the Bernau 
Manuscripts. Only the texts Nr. 14 and 15 (2004, 274-286) are explicitly dedicated 
to a genetic consideration of the correlation between the flow of Erlebnisse, the I, 
and the domain of “pre ego” which, since the Ideas I, could not trivially reduced to a 
mere formal pole of identity for the multiplicity of phenomena. This movement of re-
gressive inquiry towards the primordial phenomenon, the original field of experience 
for transcendental phenomenology relies on a special phenomenological reduction, 
which has been – as Husserl says – until now implicitly performed. The regression to-
wards the «absolute primordium», that Husserl will later in the 1930s call the «flow-
ing present of the transcendental world-consciousness» (2006, 132), goes together 
with a peculiar reduction to the «original sensuality» (2004, 275).
In fact, as we enter the realm of pure subjectivity through phenomenological reduction, on, it 
becomes clear that we have to distinguish two different things here. The reduction that gives 
us an a priori and necessary structure is the abstraction from the ego and from everything 
that is ego-related – which is a mere abstraction of course, but an important one. And then, 
in the first immanent time level, we have sensory data and sensual feelings (2004, 275-6).
This hidden sphere is called by Husserl the realm of original sensuality, where the sen-
sual tendencies that are absolutely ego-independent lie. And he divides further this 
transcendental region in two sectors. 1) If the reduction to pure sensuality is not car-
ried out completely, what is revealed is the sphere of irritability: the transcendental 
empiricism affections and reactions to affections, to sensory stimuli, in which the ego 
plays a passive role. Affections are there for an ego that suffers them – and reactions 
do not arise voluntarily from ego’s free will, on the contrary everything proceeds as 
involuntary reactions, not proper “actions”. This is the region of pure stimuli, and of 









































































intellectus agens: the area where the ego is active, where acts come voluntarily from 
the ego itself. Within this sphere a further distinction is possible: on the one hand, the 
ego’s active moment in which it directs itself toward an object, from which it has 
been affected, in the manner of attention and grasping; on the other hand there are 
spontaneous acts in the strict sense of the term, which do not presuppose any previ-
ous affection to be produced.
But how is then possible to grasp within consciousness, and thanks to 
transcendental reflection, this ego while being passive? After all, to grasp something 
means to have it as object of the grasping, i.e. as object of reflection: 
 <something> is given with an irritating character (stimulus, i.e. irritating whistle) or with a char-
acter of “formation”, of some demanding, and it’s now pointing regressively to a correlate, some-
thing existing together, that lies in a new dimension, precisely the “I do this”, “I achieve the ac-
tion”, and here we encounter the pole, something identical, that is not itself temporal (2004, 278).
This egoic pole, this “something” identical and not itself temporal (as immanent time 
of constituted unities) can be accessed only by way of its actions. It’s localized tempo-
rally by its acts and states. Hence, the “I do this”, “I achieve the action”, i.e. action and 
affection and their constitutive process have to be distinguished from the process by 
which sensory contents can become present, i.e. from the presentation of immanent 
temporal objects, to which Husserl has so far dedicated himself. The original egoic pole, 
which is not temporal or quasi-temporal, is essentially determined by the actions of 
an original praxis: the necessary correlate of the stimuli – originally given within the 
sphere of irritability – is the agent of all actions, the identical pole to which they all re-
fer, the pure ego. The pure ego is the identical, practical reference for all experiences, 
that “something existing together” the process their genetic constitution. Promptly 
Husserl can return to the problem of infinite regress, reformulating the question in 
terms of affection and action, that is to say: with the terminology that pertains to the 
domain of the pure ego. Here he describes the difference between an event that has 
been grasped by the ego and an event that has not been grasped, but still has been 
constituted withing absolute flow of consciousness, and therefore that is potential-
ly graspable. This possibility produces an affection on the ego, and the potentiality in-
volved in it the realization of it leads the ego to turn his attention (his active grasping) 
to what is affecting him, that is: leads to an intentional grasping of the event. 
However, the whole mechanism turns into a problem as both the affec-
tion and the (possible following) intentional grasping are considered themselves as 
Erlebnisse, that of course can be intentionally grasped and upon which can be phe-
nomenological reflected. In fact, 
for all the affective tendencies (the impulse, the appeal to the ego to react by turning towards 
it) that I grasp as something noticeable in the reflection [...] one could ask whether they are 
something that necessary pertain tho the background. But then all those tendencies (as a no-
ticeable ones) must not carry with them tendencies of a new level, these again and so in in-
finitum? (2004, 285).
If affection belongs to the not noted and not grasped, but always graspable sphere, 
which lies, so to speak, in the background of consciousness, then every affection must 
necessarily be accompanied by an affective tendency of second order that could “call” 
the ego to attention, and signal the object that is liable to turn attentive, ensuring the 









































































a genetically constitutive sphere of tendencies of affection and original sensuality, i.e. 
the first glimpses into the sphere of passive genesis and passive syntheses – which 
affect the Ego and nonetheless, in this passivity, are essential for the constitution 
process of a coherent world of experience – will concretely open up the curtain on 
a multiplicity of Arbeitsprobleme, whose complexity and – in a certain sense – ex-
tra-phenomenality will rather make more difficult the comprehension of the phe-
nomenological «ultimately and truly absolute» (1983, 193). The obscurity surround-
ing «the nameless above all comprehensible, that which is above all, not standing, not 
floating, not existing, but functioning» (2001, 278) will still remain a dilemma for 
Husserl, as the whole collaboration with Fink (Giubilato 2017, 232-239) and even the 
later work on the C-Manuscripts (Husserl 2006, 300-376) clearly show. 
IV. Eugen Fink’s disposition draft for the edition of Husserl’s  
Bernauer Manuscripts (1930).
As Roman Ingarden visited Husserl in Freiburg in 1927, the discussion between the two 
inevitably fell on the phenomenology of time, and especially on Husserl’s Lectures of 
1905, which at the time were being edited by Heidegger – and were finally published 
in 1928. But during the conversation suddenly Husserl invited Ingarden to come back 
the next day, as he wanted to show him something «something much more impor-
tant» (Husserl 1968, 155). In fact, the following day Husserl showed Ingarden a large 
folder containing manuscripts – about 600 pages of stenography – from his stays 
in Bernau in 1917 and 1918 and asked Ingarden to prepare them for a publication. 
Despite his grateful emotion, Ingarden had to refuse, knowing that he could not com-
plete what he called an almost impossible undertaking, and that only Husserl himself 
could have completed it. As a result, Husserl entrusted the manuscripts to his new 
assistant Eugen Fink. The fact that Fink began working on them already in the ear-
ly months of his time as Husserl’s student and assistant is demonstrated by the nu-
merous notes in his personal notes (Fink 2006; 2008). But the familiarity with this 
material is documented even more significantly by the observations, including criti-
cism, made during the drafting of a summary index (dated December the Third, 1928, 
cf. Fink 2006, 251) and also by an attempt to arrange the manuscripts, compiled to-
gether with the sketch of a premise (cf. Fink 2006, 378). Fink’s disposition drafts 
for the publication (planned together with Husserl around 1930) of the Bernauer 
Zeitmanuskripte were collected by Fink himself together with some other materi-
als of the time – specifically, those relating to the concomitant project to elaborate 
and write a System of phenomenological Philosophy – and delivered in 1969 to the 
Husserl Archive in Louvain, where they are now catalogued as L I and L II (Bruzina 
1993; 1994). The following text, translation of Eugen Fink’s original disposition draft 
for the publication of the manuscripts, has been published in: Fink (2008, 347-356). 
– – – 
E. Fink’s disposition draft for the publication of the Bernauer Zeitmanuskripte from 
the first period of editing – i.e. before the complete new editing and the new book 
manuscript Zeit und Zeitkonstitution, which contained only a few manuscript texts 
by Husserl.











































































The problem of transcendental time: in these treatises fundamentally within the eg-
ological reduction. Connection with the Ideas (cf. Husserl 1976): the reduction car-
ried out there as reduction of the first stage; characterization of the exposition of 
the transcendental time problem in the Ideas and in the “lectures” (cf. Husserl 1969). 
New presentation of the phenomenological reduction and articulation of the phe-
nomenological problem of constitution. Layout of the treatise.
1. Section: Analysis of immanent time: (Intentional analyses of perception, 
memory, a detailed analysis of recollection. - The immanent time as a mul-
ti-dimensionality of times, demonstration of the descriptive differences 
between temporality of acts and time of hyletic data, of the time of imma-
nent apriorities (eidetic relations analysis of consciousness of succession).
2. Section: The constitution of immanent time: (The acts as units in the phase 
manifolds of the inner time consciousness; time and time modality, objec-
tivity of the time modalities, apprehension and apprehension-content, 
problem of immanent perception; analysis of the time intentionality, pro-
tention and retention, determination of the “phenomenological” character 
of the “fading-away”, discussion of apparently possible interpretations. - 
The whole section deals in extenso with the problem of individuation, how-
ever, in the immanence; plots of a temporal noematic!)
3. Section: The self-constitution of the inner time consciousness: (The funda-
mental aporie of infinite regress and its overcoming by the phenomenolog-
ical restitution of an Aristotle-Brentano Doctrine! Diagram of time. Time 
and I: the monadological unity of transcendental time; a-temporality and 
temporalization of the I).
Approximate disposition of the manuscripts: 6
Introduction: various manuscript beginnings, 
but above all parts from <the> manuscript “Zur Lehre 
von den Zeitmodalitäten” (see infra).
1. Section:
1. ,,Erinnerung als Voraussetzung der Vergleichung und 
Identifizierung” (= HA L I 11/9-10, Hua XXXIII, Beil. XIX; HA L 
111/11-18, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 22).
2. “Das Bewußtsein und seine Form der immanenten Zeit” (= HA L 
118/1-4, Hua XXXIII, Beil. XXI).
3. “Empfindung und transzendental apperzeptive Wahrnehmung” 
(not from Bernau, some pages published in Hua X, Beil. XI, S. 
124-126).
4. Some parts from “Akte als Gegenstände der phänomenologis-
chen Zeit” (= HA L I 1311-14, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 6).
5. Some pages from “Eidetische Gestalt der seelischen Innerlichkeit” 
(about hyletic data and their time) (= HA L I 17/3-6, from which 
are taken the pages 5-6 in Hua XXXIII, Beil. XV).
6 The text between the brack-
ets indicates the manuscript clas-
sification in Husserl-Archiv 
(HA) and the correspondence 
with the published Husserliana 










































































1. “Auffassung und Auffassungsinhalt” (= HA L I 12/11-19, Hua 
XXXIII, pp. 153-163 and Beil. IV; HA L I 19/1-12, Hua XXXIII, Text 
Nr. 9).
2. “Zeit und Zeitmodalitäten” ( = HA L I 21/4-21, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 
10 and Beil. V).
3. “Zur Lehre von den Zeitmodalitäten” ( = HA L I 21/24-39, Hua 
XXXIII, Text Nr. 7).
4.  “Objektivität der Zeitmodalitäten” (EFA B-II 64a-73b = HA L I 
5/1-15, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 5).
5. “Das Ineinander von Retention und Protention” (= HA L I 16/1-13, 
Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 1 and Beil. I).
6. “Wichtige Ausführungen über Retention und Vergegenwärtigung” 
(= HA L I 14, of which only page nr. 8 has been published in Hua 
XXXIII, Beil. III).
7. “Retentionale Modifikation und kontinuierliche Modifikation 
überhaupt” (=Transcription by Edith Stein, HA L I 4/2-9, Hua 
XXXIII, Text Nr. 3).
8. “Das Formensystem in der Zeitkonstitution” (= HA L I 2, Hua 
XXXIII, Beil. VII-X).
9. “Die ß-Blätter” (= HA L I 311-7, Hua XXXIIl, Text Nr. 13).
3. Section:
1. “Neuer Versuch der Aufklärung der Strukturen des 
Zeitgegenständlichkeit-konstituierenden Bewußtseins” (= HA LI 
15/3-38, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 2, 11 and Beil. VI)
2. “Das Ego und die subjektive Zeit” (= HA B II 10/3-8, Hua IX, S. 415-
418; HA B II 10/13-
3. 14; HA B 1I 10/17-21, all not from Bernau)
4. “Eidetische Gestalt” (= HA L 117/9-13, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr.15)
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